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Abstract
Agency theory has served as a key basis for identifying
drivers of offshore information system project success. Consequently, the role of relational factors in driving project
success has been overlooked in this literature. In this paper,
we address this gap by integrating the social embeddedness
1
This paper was recommended for acceptance by Associate Guest Editor
Peter Seddon.

Note: The appendices for this paper are available online at http://misq.org/
archivist/appendices//RaiMarupingAppendices.pdf.

perspective and the culture literature to theorize how and why
relational factors affect the success of offshore IS projects
that are strategic in nature. We identify organizational and
interpersonal cultural differences as critical success factors
in this context. Using data from a longitudinal field study of
155 offshore IS projects managed by 22 project leaders, we
found evidence of a relationship between hypothesized relational factors and two measures of offshore IS project
success—namely, project cost overruns and client satisfaction—over and above the effects of project characteristics and
agency factors. Specifically, we found that information
exchange, joint problem solving, and trust reduce project cost
overruns and improve client satisfaction. We also found a
relationship between cultural differences at the organizational and team level, and offshore IS project success. The
model explained 40 percent and 41 percent of the variance in
project cost overruns and client satisfaction, respectively, for
projects with a client representative. For projects with no
client representative, the model explained 35 percent and 37
percent of the variance in project cost overruns and client
satisfaction, respectively. Collectively, the results have important theoretical and practical implications for how client–
vendor relationships should be managed when partnering
with offshore firms and designing offshore IS project teams.
Keywords: Offshoring, social embeddedness, project management, agency theory, culture, multilevel

Introduction
The offshoring of information systems development projects,
which is the focus of our investigation, involves a client
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organization’s outsourcing of a development project to a
vendor located in another country (Carmel and Agarwal 2002;
Gopal et al. 2002). China and India, two of the most populous countries with a large and expanding base of information
technology human capital, have emerged as the largest centers
for offshored IT work (Friedman 2005). In particular, offshoring of IS projects to these countries has gained momentum as companies strive to offset the IT costs associated with
developing not only routine, transaction-based systems, but
also complex, customized strategic systems (Carmel and
Agarwal 2002). The momentum in offshoring has resulted in
an annual growth rate of 20 percent, with estimates of
U.S.$17.2 billion worth of IS projects offshored to India
(Thibodeau 2005). India’s offshoring industry alone is
projected to reach U.S.$60 billion by 2010 (Ribeiro 2005).
These offshoring decisions have been triggered not only by
lower labor costs but also by Six Sigma quality control
systems and process capabilities, such as Level-5 Capability
Maturity Model (CMM) certifications, of leading offshore
vendors (Kaiser and Hawk 2004).
While there are potential benefits in offshoring IS development, there are significant challenges associated with realizing them. Despite the employment of practices prescribed
by the agency theory perspective to promote success in
offshore IS development projects, several companies, such as
Life Time Fitness, have reported significant overruns in
budget and schedule. Postmortems of such failed projects
point to relational factors, such as communication challenges
and misunderstandings due to cultural differences, as key
reasons for cost escalation and client dissatisfaction (Bertch
2003; Krishna et al. 2004; Sahay et al. 2003). The implications of such challenges are especially significant for strategic
projects that are idiosyncratic in nature and complex in scope,
given that such projects require the integration of tacit
knowledge across the client and vendor firm (Nicholson and
Sahay 2004). Relational factors that characterize the nature
of the interaction in the exchange process between two parties
can have a profound influence on the transmission and
integration of such knowledge (Uzzi 1997), which is critical
for offshore IS project success. In light of the critical nature
of these projects and the problems being encountered, our
research objective is to understand the role of relational
factors in influencing strategic offshore IS project success.
From a theoretical perspective, some progress has been made
on how to manage offshore IS projects, primarily by drawing
on the IS outsourcing literature that has evaluated agencyrelated factors, including formal and psychological contracts,
and project characteristics (e.g., Banerjee and Duflo 2000;
Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Gopal et al. 2003; Koh et al.
2004; Nidumolu and Subramani 2003). This literature pro-
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vides strong evidence that formal controls, incentives, and
project characteristics influence the success of offshore IS
projects. However, agency theory is constrained in its explanatory power. It limits attention to the motivations for selfinterested behaviors and to formal mechanisms that safeguard
against them (Dyer and Singh 1998; Uzzi 1997), and does not
directly address the relational aspects of interfirm interactions.
Offshore IS projects require that teams effectively collaborate
to integrate specialized and tacit knowledge distributed across
firm and cultural boundaries (Faraj and Sproull 2000; Guinan
et al. 1998; Kirsch 1997; Koh et al. 2004; Nicholson and
Sahay 2004). In such settings, the social embeddedness perspective suggests that the structure of the exchange relationship has a significant impact on economic action (Granovetter
1985; Uzzi 1997). Its core argument is that embedded relations, in contrast to atomistic arms-length exchanges, exhibit
shared norms and values, reduce the need for monitoring and
control, and facilitate the transfer of information and integration of specialized knowledge and capabilities. The
economic implication of such embeddedness is expected to be
especially important in a context such as strategic IS project
development, where tacit knowledge has to be integrated and
idiosyncratic problems have to be addressed. Thus, the social
embeddedness perspective is an appropriate lens through
which to understand the role of relational factors in offshore
IS project success.
To add to our understanding on how to manage offshore IS
projects, we follow Johns’ (2006) recommendation to contextualize theory by evaluating the impact of properties of
social structure in the offshore IS project context. We evaluate how espoused cultural characteristics of the IS project
leader influence success. Further, we contextualize the social
embeddedness perspective2 to the IS offshore context and
apply a cultural differences framing to evaluate shared values
and norms in projects with client representation. We assess
these differences at two levels: (1) between the cultural
norms for work practices (Hofstede et al. 1990) of the client
and vendor firm; and (2) between the espoused cultural values
of two key individuals (e.g., Srite and Karahanna 2006) in a
team: the project leader and the client representative. We
empirically test our hypotheses using a sample of 155 strategic IS projects that were offshored by U.S. firms to a major
Indian vendor with Level-5 CMMi certification. Our study
contributes to the IS offshoring literature by augmenting
explanations of agency and project characteristics for offshore
IS project success, with factors related to social structure and
cultural differences.

2

The terms social embeddedness and relational exchange have been used
interchangeably in the literature.
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Theoretical Framework and
Hypotheses Development
We first set the stage for our theory development by specifying the type of project that is of interest to us. Our focus is
on strategic projects that are inherently idiosyncratic and
require the integration of tacit knowledge and business
domain expertise from the client with the technical development expertise of the vendor. The key constructs that we
consider in our theorizing about offshore IS project success
are mapped to the social embeddedness perspective and
summarized in Table 1. As shown in Table 1, the project
characteristics and agency-related factors that are well
established in the literature are specified as control variables.
We proceed to develop our logic for a social embeddedness
perspective for offshore IS projects, contextualize the
relational exchange mechanisms for the development of
offshore projects, and derive specific hypotheses for each of
these mechanisms. Following these hypotheses, we augment
the role of relational mechanisms with the role of project
leader cultural values and shared values and norms. We
suggest that the cultural characteristics of the project leader
can have a significant impact on project success. We also
argue that cultural differences operate at two levels—at the
macro-level between the firms and at the micro-level between
the client representative and IS project leader—with cultural
differences having an impact on offshore IS project success.

focus our attention on such customized IT solutions that are
strategic in nature for the client firm, as their successful
development is especially sensitive to the integration of
specialized knowledge that is distributed across the onshore
client and offshore vendor and, therefore, across cultural
boundaries.

Social Embeddedness and Offshore
IS Project Success

Types of Offshore IS Projects: A Focus on
Strategic Projects

In the offshoring context, the onshore client solicits the
services of the offshore vendor to manage an IS project and
thereby establishes a cross-cultural exchange relationship for
the project. We suggest that an agent-theoretic perspective
does not fully capture the key elements of social structure and
the cultural context of the exchange relationship in which
these offshored IS development projects occur. To elaborate,
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as
“a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s))
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on
their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making
authority to the agent” (p. 308). Based on this definition,
agency theory frames the interaction within the offshored project as an arms-length relationship between client and vendor
with minimal information exchange and trust, and limited, if
any, joint decision-making. Thus, while agency theory guides
how the goals and actions of the principal and agent can be
aligned through contracts and incentives, it does not consider
how the social structure of the offshored IS project affects
economic actions and outcomes.

IS project offshoring involves a client organization outsourcing all or part of IS project work to a vendor in a different country. The contracting firms can engage in offshore
IS projects for cost-only or broader strategic reasons (Carmel
and Agarwal 2002). To pursue cost efficiencies, a firm can
outsource noncore IS projects, such as those for routine
transactions (Lacity and Willcocks 1998; Lee et al. 2004), for
which offshore vendors likely have developed reusable
modules and components. In contrast, the client firm can
engage in offshore arrangements to develop complex end-toend systems or new IT products for its business needs
(Carmel and Agarwal 2002). For such systems, the vendor
has to devote resources to understand the client’s business
domain knowledge and its differentiated requirements in
contrast to solutions that entail the repackaging of previously
developed and tested modules. As Sedigh-Ali et al. (2001)
note, the risks and cost structures associated with systems that
are custom developed are different from systems that are
developed using commercial off-the-shelf components. We

We draw on the social embeddednes perspective (MacNeil
1983; Uzzi 1996, 1997) to assert that the relational characteristics underlying the exchange relationship in offshored IS
projects have a major impact on their success. This perspective suggests that three key characteristics—namely, joint
problem solving, fine-grained information transfer, and
trust—lead to superior outcomes, especially when all information cannot be codified and transferred through market
mechanisms and each partner in the exchange relationship
possesses significant tacit knowledge and domain specialization (MacNeil 1983; Uzzi 1996; Uzzi and Lancaster 2003).
These conditions, under which the relational characteristics
become especially important, characterize strategic offshore
IS projects. Specifically, the onshore firm specializes in the
business context in which the system will be used and in the
requirements for the system to be developed, while the offshore firm specializes in the development process, including
formalizing requirements, translating these requirements into
design artifacts, and then building the functional system to
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Table 1. Model Summary
Category of Constructs

Constructs (control variables are italicized)

Agency Factors

Granularity of service level agreements
Risk sharing

Relational Mechanisms and
Cultural Considerations

Project Characteristics

Project complexity
Requirements uncertainty
Project size
Project duration

Leveraging relational mechanisms and
aligning norms for organizational work
practices (H1-H4)

Firm history
Client participation for joint problem solving
Information exchange activities through site visits
Trust of client in vendor for open governance architecture
Shared norms: Client-vendor differences in work practices

Augmenting relational mechanisms
with project leader cultural values (H5)

Project leader experience
Espoused cultural values of project leader from vendor firm

Aligning cultural values of client representative and project leader (H6)

Shared values
Cultural differences of client representative and project leader from
vendor firm

conform to design specifications (Nicholson and Sahay 2004).
We suggest that, under such conditions, projects characterized
by relational structures for joint problem solving, fine-grained
information transfer, and trust should outperform those that do
not have these characteristics.
While the social embeddedness perspective highlights information exchange, joint problem solving, and trust as factors
that are critical for successful interorganizational relationships, it says little about the role of shared norms and values.
We suggest that higher degrees of social embeddedness
should be characterized by shared norms and values between
collaborators. Under such conditions, partners are more likely
to agree on important goals and how work should be accomplished. Also, shared norms and values facilitate the effective
functioning of teams, enabling team members to contribute
their expertise toward collaborative tasks (e.g., Earley and
Mosakowski 2000; Kirsch et al. 2002). In addition, shared
cultural norms and values assist in the transmission of tacit
knowledge between partners in the exchange relationship. As
we will argue in greater detail later, because offshore IS
projects span national boundaries, organizational and national
cultural characteristics represent key norms and values that
likely influence the effectiveness of collaboration (Krishna et
al. 2004; Walsham 2002). Thus, our main argument is that,
like information exchange, joint problem solving, and trust,
shared cultural norms and values are an important aspect of
social embeddedness in offshore IS projects. We now discuss
how these mechanisms operate in the context of offshore IS
projects. Our model is presented in Figure 1.
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Joint Problem Solving: Role of Client Participation
Client participation in software development is generally
instrumental for project success as client members can provide immediate feedback as alternate solutions are explored
during the development process (Hartwick and Barki 1994;
Ives and Olson 1984). The presence of a client member on an
offshore IS project team represents a structure for joint
problem solving (Hartwick and Barki 1994). Such structures
for joint problem solving are established to generate rapid and
explicit feedback and to enrich capabilities for developing
effective solutions (Hunton and Beeler 1997). In contrast,
market exchange does not provide direct feedback and clients
use an exit/stay strategy based on the vendor’s performance
toward providing a solution. In the context of offshore IS
projects, the formal participation of the client on the project
team should facilitate problem recognition and resolution, the
generation of ideas, and the acceleration of learning. Thus,
we hypothesize
H1: Client participation—that is, having a client member on
the offshore project team—will positively influence offshore IS project success.
Information Exchange: Role of Site Visits by
Client and Vendor
The IS and project management literatures provide evidence
of the importance of knowledge integration for project suc-
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PROJECT LEADER
CULTURAL VALUES
Uncertainty avoidance
Long-term orientation
Power distance
Masculinity
Individualism

CONTROLS (Level-2)
Project leader experience

(H5)

Level-2
(Project leader level)
Level-1
(Project level)
RELATIONAL FACTORS
Client representative
Trust
Client visits
Team visits

•
•
•
•
•
•

VENDOR-CLIENT WORK
PRACTICES DIFFERENCES
Process
Employee
Parochial
Open
Loose
Normative

•
•
•
•
•

LEADER-CLIENT REP
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
Uncertainty avoidance
Long-term orientation
Power distance
Masculinity
Individualism

(H1, H2, H3)

PROJECT SUCCESS

(H4)

(H6)

CONTROLS (Level-1)
Project complexity
Requirements uncertainty
Project size
Project duration
SLA granularity
Risk sharing
Firm history

Figure 1. Research Model

cess and the need to isolate effective mechanisms that
facilitate integration in a given context (Mitchell 2006;
Nagarajan and Mitchell 1998). For example, Mitchell (2006)
identified effective practices for integrating knowledge in
enterprise application integration projects. These studies
conclude that interaction routines are a key mechanism that
enables the exchange of information among parties with
complementary knowledge. As suggested earlier, individuals
or groups in the client and vendor firm possess specialized
knowledge for distinct aspects of the project. Those specializing in requirements determination and business analytics
depend on those specializing in programming to implement
and monitor their decisions, while those specializing in
programming depend on those specializing in business
analytics to collect information and make decisions that can,
in effect, be implemented. Thus, these relationships call for
the transfer of fine-grained information that is unlikely to
occur through market exchange mechanisms and requires rich
face-to-face interactions to bridge cultural boundaries.

In embedded relationships, the information that is transferred
is more proprietary and tacit than in arms-length market
exchanges (Inkpen and Tsang 2005). Interaction routines that
characterize relational exchange, such as site visits, facilitate
access to strategic information and tacit know-how (Nicholson and Sahay 2004). These activities and routines enable the
credentialing of information based on the credibility of the
source, facilitate its interpretation, and make it possible to
appropriately value the information at hand (Uzzi 1996).
Such fine-grained information exchange should increase the
adaptation, responsiveness, coordination, and learning of
partners, which should contribute to the success of offshore IS
projects. Thus, we hypothesize
H2: Information exchange activities between the client and
vendor—that is, having client site visits to the vendor and
vendor site visits to the client—will positively influence
offshore IS project success.
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Trust of Client in Vendor: Role of Open
Governance Architectures
Trust represents one party’s willingness to be vulnerable to
another party (Mayer et al. 1995). Organizations are reluctant
to divulge information that is private and strategic in nature
and not accessible through markets, as misappropriation of
such information can adversely impact their competitiveness
(Klein et al. 2007). In order to develop effective software
solutions, offshore IS project teams require intimate knowledge of the client firm’s business processes, technology
architectures, and data resources (Ross and Beath 2006).
Trust facilitates the sharing of such private information that is
not available through markets and is vulnerable to opportunistic behavior from a self-interested party (Klein et al.
2007; Uzzi and Lancaster 2003). Specifically, trust-based
governance creates an open architecture that promotes the
exchange of information, expertise, and services that are
crucial to achieving outcomes but difficult to contractually
stipulate a priori (Uzzi 1996). This exchange is facilitated as
trust safeguards against opportunistic behavior by the partner.
The free flow of information, facilitated by trust, increases the
ability of the partnership to adapt to unforeseen problems.
Finally, it creates conditions for benefits to be extended from
one partner to the other and for these benefits to be reciprocated by the other in the future. Thus, we hypothesize
H3: Trust of the client in the vendor will positively influence
offshore IS project success.
Shared Norms: Differences in Cultural
Norms of Client and Vendor
Earlier, we highlighted shared norms as an important aspect
of social embeddedness. We theorize that differences in cultural norms between the client and vendor firm impede
offshore IS project success. Firms with similar cultural norms
should be able to economize cognitive resources, time, and
attention that are required to interpret complex information
and make quality decisions. In fact, shared norms are especially important in contexts where the problem is unique and
the uncertainty is high, as in the case of strategic offshore IS
projects. Past research on decision-making heuristics (Kahneman and Tversky 1982) is consistent with this theme on how
embedded social structures establish common norms and
understanding that enhance the capacity of partners to process
stimuli, and to gather and process information (Uzzi 1997).
Empirical work on cultural similarity in contexts, such as joint
ventures and mergers, indicates that differences in cultural
norms create psychological hurdles. Consequently, alliances
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between organizations with similar cultural norms are more
likely to be successful than those between organizations with
dissimilar ones (Pothukuchi et al. 2002). Moreover, differences in cultural norms make it costly to negotiate positions
and to integrate management practices and knowledge—goals
that must be effectively accomplished for the success of
offshore IS projects (Pothukuchi et al. 2002).
We draw on Hofstede et al.’s (1990) organizational cultural
norms to assess the differences in work-related practices
between the onshore client and offshore vendor. They isolate
six work-related practices that are characteristics of the
organizational unit, not the individuals: (1) process-oriented
versus result-oriented (contrasts a concern for means with
goals); (2) employee-oriented versus job-oriented (contrasts
a concern for people with getting the job done); (3) parochial
versus professional (contrasts employee identity derived from
the organization with profession); (4) open system versus
closed system (contrasts organizations based on communication climate); (5) loose control versus tight control (contrasts
organizations based on level of internal control); and
(6) normative versus pragmatic (contrasts organizations based
on rule-orientation with customer-orientation).
Differences in process versus result orientation can create
conflicts about the rigidity with which work is organized.
Process-oriented work practices tend to be mechanistic
whereas result-oriented work practices are more organic
(Hofstede et al. 1990; Pothukuchi et al. 2002). Differences
can give rise to incompatibility in coordinating work, such as
requirement specification, design, and testing. Differences in
employee versus job orientation have implications for expectations about delivery schedules and whether employees are
pushed to reach project milestones on time (Blake and
Mouton 1964). Miscommunication and/or misunderstanding
will lead to confusion about such expectations. When client
and vendor firms differ on parochial versus professional
orientation, the mechanisms for governing work may conflict
with each other. As Pothukuchi et al. (2002) note, parochial
orientation tends to emphasize clan governance whereas
professional orientation emphasizes market governance.
Confusion about goal expectations can result when approaches to governance differ. Differences in open versus
closed systems across firms are detrimental to project success,
particularly given the importance of complete information.
Misaligned communication climates hamper the ability of
client and vendor firms to interact effectively. Differences in
loose versus tight control can lead to conflicts about where
decision rights reside. Disagreements often result in distrust
that hampers collaboration (Pothukuchi et al. 2002; Putnam
and Poole 1987). Finally, differences in normative versus
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pragmatic orientation can give rise to conflicting practices.
In sum, to the extent that the onshore client and the offshore
vendor differ on these cultural norms, their management
tendencies and work structures should be incompatible,
misunderstandings and interaction problems should be
exacerbated, and the psychological hurdles for collaboration
will be high. Thus, we hypothesize
H4: Differences in norms—that is, having differences in work
practices between the client and vendor organizations—
will negatively influence offshore IS project success.
Role of Project Leader Values
A project leader’s espoused culture encompasses values that
form the basis of their schemata of how the world works
(Bartunek and Moch 1987; Earley, 1993). The concept of
espoused culture (henceforth referred to as culture) recognizes
that individuals of the same national origin may vary in the
degree to which they embrace the values associated with their
national culture (e.g., Srite and Karahanna 2006). Consequently, the schemata possessed by individuals within the
same nation are likely to differ. These schemata translate into
patterns of behavior that people exhibit in relating to the
world around them (Harris 1994). The five key cultural
values are uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation,
power distance, individualism/collectivism, and masculinity/
femininity (Hofstede 1980, 2001). Although Hofstede’s work
has conceptualized these cultural values at the national level,
they have been treated as being espoused at the individual
level in much prior work (e.g., Bochner and Hesketh 1994;
Cox et al. 1991; Earley 1989, 1993; Gomez et al. 2001; Srite
and Karahanna 2006) and consistent with this, we define these
constructs at the individual level—that is, espoused culture.
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the degree of tolerance an
individual has for uncertainty and ambiguity. High uncertainty avoidance individuals have a low tolerance for uncertainty and prefer structured situations. Uncertainty reduction
mechanisms, such as rules, laws, and controls, are highly
favored by such individuals. In contrast, low uncertainty
avoidance individuals have a high tolerance for uncertainty
and ambiguity and such individuals are often open to change,
are willing to take risks, and are open to varying opinions on
important decisions (Berger 1979; Early and Stubblebine
1989). Long-term orientation refers to the extent to which an
individual adheres to forward thinking. High long-term
orientation individuals value long-term commitments and this
often translates into a degree of rigidity with respect to
change. Low long-term orientation individuals place less

emphasis on long-term commitments and prefer change to
occur more rapidly (Hofstede 1980). Power distance is the
extent to which status inequalities are recognized and
accepted. Low power distance individuals do not accept that
there are status inequalities in hierarchical organizational
structures. In contrast, high power distance individuals accept
that status inequalities exist and revere those of higher status
than themselves (Srite and Karahanna 2006). Individualism/
collectivism refers to the degree to which an individual’s
social behavior is driven by personal rather than collective
goals. Individualistic individuals find it quite acceptable for
personal goals to supersede collective goals. Collectivistic
individuals emphasize the goals of the collective over their
own personal goals (Redding and Baldwin 1991; Srite and
Karahanna 2006). Finally, masculinity/femininity is the extent
to which emotional gender roles are recognized with respect
to work. Individuals with masculine values emphasize work
goals, assertiveness, and achievement. In contrast, feminine
values include nurturing, concern for others, and quality of
life (Hofstede 1980).
We expect project leader cultural values to influence offshore
IS project success. Project leaders exhibiting high uncertainty
avoidance are likely to aggressively reduce risks, enforce
conformance to plans, and reduce deviations from them (Sully
de Luque and Sommer 2000). Also, such project leaders are
likely to conform to and enforce norms and rules (Shackleton
and Ali 1990). In offshore IS projects, uncertainty about how
well the project team is adhering to client values or progressing toward meeting client goals will prompt high
uncertainty avoidance project leaders to exert tight process
and outcome controls to ensure successful project completion.
High long-term orientation project leaders value long-term
commitments over short-term gains. Such project leaders are
likely willing to forego pursuing the project team’s goals in
order to ensure that client goals are achieved. Prioritizing
client goals enables the project team to sustain the vendor–
client relationship over time. A high long-term orientation
project leader would prevent the team from pursuing its own
interests and ensure that team goals are aligned with client
goals. High power distance project leaders are likely to
recognize the power differential between the vendor and
client and, thus, will likely comply with client directives.
Project leaders who embrace collectivistic values will place
the goals of the client ahead of their own personal goals, thus
making them more likely to guide the project in the best
interests of the client. Finally, given their emphasis on work
goals, project leaders with high masculinity are more likely to
stress goal accomplishment by striving to meet project deadlines and deliver a high quality product. Thus, we
hypothesize
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H5: Project leader cultural values will influence offshore IS
project success.
Shared Values: Cultural Differences Between Client
Representative and Project Leader
H1 suggested that client representation on offshore teams is
preferred. However, simply having a client representative on
the team may be insufficient. Important design decisions
must also be made with regard to team composition (Ancona
and Caldwell 1992; Campion et al. 1993). This is especially
critical for offshore IS project teams that span cultural
boundaries (Krishna et al. 2004; Walsham 2002). The relational exchange perspective, with its macro focus, says little
about how such offshore teams should be designed.
Interpersonal differences play a significant role in facilitating
the effective functioning of teams (Harrison et al. 2002). In
offshore IS project teams, the concepts of shared values and
norms in the relational perspective are reflected in the cultural
differences between the client representative and the project
leader. As we noted earlier, cultural differences or similarities also mean that the schemata through which these key
stakeholders view the world may also be different or similar.
The effects of these shared values and norms are expected to
be isomorphic across organizational and team levels of
analysis, leading to greater offshore IS project success.
Although the relationships are expected to be isomorphic
across levels of analysis, the underlying mechanisms differ as
interpersonal differences take center stage at the team level.
At the team level, collaborative tasks, such as software
development, make cultural differences salient as different
work patterns emerge during a project. Differences in cultural
values can disrupt work efficiency by giving way to incompatible work patterns and creating conflict (Harrison et al.
2002; Lau and Murnighan 1998). For instance, Watson et al.
(1993) found that teams with a nationally diverse membership
were less efficient than teams with a nationally homogenous
membership. In offshore IS project teams, client representatives possess relevant domain knowledge (e.g., understanding
of business processes, hierarchical reporting structures) that
is needed for successful project completion. With this domain
knowledge, client members are charged with evaluating and
approving decisions about the functionality of the software
project (Kirsch et al. 2002). Project leaders in offshore IS
projects determine how work on the project gets accomplished through, for example, task assignment and scheduling
of deadlines (Guinan et al. 1998). When a client representative and project leader share similar cultural values, they are
more likely to agree on the appropriate work patterns
necessary to meet project objectives. This facilitates more
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efficient project task accomplishment as it provides a common
platform for problem solving. Consistent with this idea, team
mental model research suggests that shared mental models—
about how tasks are accomplished—facilitate greater team
performance (Mathieu et al. 2000). In contrast, cultural
differences between the client representative and project
leader can lead to conflicts over how to solve problems and
accomplish tasks (Walsham 2002). Even when the client
representative and project leader do eventually reach convergence on problem solving and task accomplishment,
significant process losses occur as a result of the different
schemata by which these parties operate. Divergence in this
regard often leads to an inefficient use of time and resources.
These inefficiencies hamper offshore IS project success.
Thus, we hypothesize
H6: Differences in values—that is, having cultural dissimilarity between the client representative and the
project team leader—will negatively influence offshore
IS project success.

Method
We tested our model in a field study of offshore IS projects
managed by a leading software vendor in India that has a
Level-5 CMMi certification. The selection of this vendor
enabled us to control for variance in project cost overruns and
client satisfaction due to process maturation levels. The
vendor has managed numerous offshore IS projects for clients
in various countries, including the United States, Germany,
and Japan. In this section, we describe the sample, measurement, and data collection process.

Sample and Participants
Our sampling frame was a list of 585 software projects that
were strategic in nature to U.S. clients, and these projects
were completed over a four-year period, starting in July 2001.
The projects we targeted were classified as custom development projects by the vendor and, therefore, did not include
simple projects that had highly modularized and nearly outof-the-box solutions from the vendor (e.g., systems for standardized billing and payroll processes). Examples of projects
included a software solution that would allow a client to do
business with some partners by being compliant with a particular process standard (e.g., RosettaNet), a complete human
resource information system, and an integrated customer
relationship management system following the acquisition of
another company by a client company. We provide an overview of a project as an illustration in Appendix A. From the
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585 projects, we selected the 155 that were with U.S. clients
because aspects of interest to us, including site visits, trust,
and culture, were tracked for these projects. In 24 of the 155
projects, the client representative and project leader had
worked together on previous projects; 53 of the 155 project
teams had no client representative.

Measurement
Two indicators of offshore IS project success were included
as dependent variables in our model. First, we included
project cost overruns as an objective outcome measure of
project success. Consistent with Nidumolu (1995), cost overruns were calculated as the percentage difference between
actual project costs and budgeted project costs. Actual project
cost was measured as a linear composite of three cost components: (1) billed man-hours for the development effort;
(2) negotiated billed expenditures related to specialized
software, training, conferences, and visits to sites of customers or partners of client firms; and (3) additional expenditures incurred by the client above and beyond the negotiated
billed expenses. Project cost overruns are an important
indicator of project success because, although a project may
be of high quality, the cost of producing the software product
may exceed projected costs (Nidumolu 1995). Second, we
included client satisfaction with the final product as a second
outcome measure of project success. Four months after the
projects were delivered, clients provided ratings of their
satisfaction with the final product. A four-item scale consistent with Nidumolu (1995) was used to capture client
satisfaction.
To capture differences in client–vendor work norms, we
measured client firm work practices and vendor firm work
practices using the Hofstede et al. (1990) work culture scales.
Specifically, we used three-item scales for each of the six
dimensions of organizational work practices: process versus
result orientation, employee versus job orientation, parochialism versus professionalism, open versus closed system,
loose versus tight control, and normative versus pragmatic
orientation. Differences in work practices were calculated as
the absolute difference in client and vendor responses to each
dimension of this scale. Account managers provided
responses for vendor-side work practices and business unit
managers provided responses for client-side work practices.
Cultural values—namely, uncertainty avoidance, long-term
orientation, power distance, individualism/collectivism, and
masculinity/femininity—of project leaders and client representatives were measured on a 100-point scale using items
from Hofstede (2007) as specified in the VSM 94 manual.

We measured these values at the individual level and calculated client-leader differences as the absolute difference in
client and leader responses to each of the five cultural characteristics. For example, power distance is the absolute difference between the leader’s and the client representative’s
power distance scores. We measured client trust in the vendor using a three-item scale adapted from Aulakh et al.
(1996).
A dummy variable, Client representative, was used to indicate
whether a project team had a client representative present or
not. The variable Clientmeet measured the number of times
the client visited the project team. Teammeet was measured
as the number of times the members of the project team
visited the client site. We also coded Teammeet, weighted by
the number of team members on each client visit, even if they
all traveled at the exact same time and for the exact same
duration—the logic is that the more members on the client
site, the greater the extent of interaction and information
exchange between the vendor and client. The various survey
items are shown in Appendix B.

Control Variables
To safeguard against rival explanations, we specify four sets
of control variables: (1) key project characteristics; (2) agency
control mechanisms of service level agreements and the
nature of risk sharing; (3) self-controls from the level of process maturity; and (4) history effects.
To account for variations in project characteristics, we controlled for three structural aspects: project size, project complexity, and requirements uncertainty (see Keil et al. 2000;
Ravichandran and Rai 2000; Wallace et al. 2004). Specifically, project size was measured as lines of code; project
complexity was measured using the number of adjusted
function points, which adjusts the count of function points by
the total ratings of 14 complexity characteristics that account
for the different kinds of system requirements and development environments (see Albrecth and Gaffney 1983;
Mukhopadhyay et al. 1992); and requirements uncertainty
was measured as the number of formal written changes to
requirements that were made to the contract. The measure for
each of these three project characteristics was obtained from
project documents. In addition, we controlled for project
duration, which was measured as the number of months taken
to complete the project.
To account for differences in agency contractual mechanisms
used across projects, we specify granularity of service level
agreements and risk sharing as control variables. We select
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these two variables as agency theory and studies that apply
this theory to IS project management note that characteristics
of formal controls influence the extent to which the agent
works in the best interest of the principal (Eisenhardt 1985;
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Kirsch 1997). Specifically,
service level agreements (SLAs) are one key mechanism that
formally define outcome expectations and track actual
performance against these expectations. These agreements
can differ in monitoring granularity, ranging from detailed
specification of expectations (e.g., time and quality for activities) to a much more coarse specification of these expectations (Lewis and Rai 2006). Accordingly, SLA granularity
was measured in terms of the detail at which project activities
were monitored. We used the following heuristics to assign
scores for SLA granularity: a score of 3 for closely monitoring activities using detailed SLAs; a score of 2 for a
moderate level of SLA-based monitoring; and a score of 1 for
the least granular SLA-based monitoring.
For the second agency factor, risk sharing, we coded the
contracts to distinguish among three levels of increasing risk
sharing for the vendor to efficiently meet goals for the client:
(1) time-and-materials; (2) fixed-price; and (3) fixed-price
plus incentives and/or penalties for meeting or missing
performance targets. As Gopal et al. (2003) demonstrated,
fixed price contracts skew risks toward the vendor and timeand-material contracts place the burden of the risk on the
client. Moreover, Ravichandran and Rai (2000) note that
rewards and penalties play an important role in the outcomes
of systems development projects. Thus, we include a third
category of contracts, which we label “fixed-price plus
rewards and penalties.”
In addition to the client using risk sharing and monitoring to
exercise control on the vendor, self-controls can be used by
the vendor to control its activities and processes (Choudhury
and Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997). We control for the level
of process maturity of the vendor, as differing levels of
maturity can impact the success of offshore IS projects (see
Ravichandran and Rai 2000). Finally, we controlled for two
forms of history effects: (1) the project leader’s experience
with managing offshore IS projects (measured as the number
of projects a leader had previously managed); and (2) firm
history effects (calculated as the number of previous projects
that the vendor had completed for the client firm).

Procedure
We collected data by working closely with the vendor company. As we were collecting data about projects unfolding in
their naturally occurring state in the real world, we sought to
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collect data at the beginning and end of each project. Survey
data on cultural values were collected from project leaders at
the beginning and end of the project. Although the leader
data were collected at the start and end of each project, we
used the first survey filled out by each leader in our analysis.
Interestingly, an examination of the correlations of the leader
data over time showed them to be highly correlated (r > .80 in
all cases), thus alleviating concerns related to changing
cultural values of the leaders over time.
Data related to project characteristics, agency factors, client
representation on teams, differences in organizational work
practices, meetings between client and vendors, and client
representative cultural values were collected from project
documents at the end of the development phase of each
project. The combination of perceptual and archival sources
of data collection is a major strength of the procedure and
adds to the validity. An additional strength of the procedure
is that client satisfaction data were collected four months after
project completion.

Results
This section is organized to first provide the results of our
preliminary analyses examining reliability and validity; this
is followed by an overview of multilevel modeling in general
and hierarchical linear modeling, which is the approach used
to conduct our analysis; and, finally, we report the results of
our model testing.

Preliminary Analysis
All multi-item measures were adapted from previously validated scales and the results of our factor analysis confirm
their convergent and discriminant validity. In addition, the
reliability of each measure was greater than 0.70, thus
meeting threshold requirements. Given that the scales used
were well-established and these results are consistent with
reported findings, we do not provide detailed results in the
interest of space. Tables 2 and 3 present the means, standard
deviations, and correlations of the constructs in the model,
corresponding to the full sample and the subsample with
client representation. Metrics of size, complexity, and
requirements uncertainty indicated that these projects were
indeed quite complex. Also, our sample of projects exhibited
quite a bit of a variance on these three key project characteristics. Specifically, the project size and complexity
indicate the average number of lines of code to be over
400,000, with the standard deviation being about 70,000, and
the adjusted number of function points to be, on average, over
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9,000, with a standard deviation over 2,000. As can be
expected, the mean values for the project leader’s cultural
values (Table 2) are comparable with mean values at the
national level for India (Hofstede 2007). However, their
standard deviations range from about 7 to 11, indicating
individual variation within India and supporting the notion
that cultural values were indeed espoused at the individual
level (i.e., by project leaders) in our sample. Also, in
examining the differences between the cultural values of
client representatives and project leaders, we notice that the
pattern of differences is consistent with what is reported in
Hofstede (2007) for the United States versus India. However,
as was the case with the scores of the project leaders, here too
we see substantial variance in the differences, underscoring
the importance of espoused cultural values and differences.
Further, the scores on various cultural values for both project
leaders and client representatives from which the differences
were computed were, on average, generally consistent with
what is noted by Hofstede (2007). Consistent with prior
research, project size, project complexity, and requirements
uncertainty are positively correlated with project cost overruns and negatively correlated with client satisfaction; SLA
granularity is negatively correlated with project cost overruns
and positively correlated with client satisfaction. Client
representation on the team, number of client visits to the team,
and number of team visits to the client are negatively correlated with project cost overruns and positively correlated
with client satisfaction. Differences in work practices
between the client and vendor and differences in client–leader
cultural values are positively correlated with project cost
overruns and negatively correlated with client satisfaction.

Hierarchical Linear Modeling
Given the multilevel nature of the hypotheses and data, we
used random coefficient modeling (RCM) for the analysis
(Bliese and Ployhart 2002; Bryk and Raudenbush 1992).
Specifically, we used HLM 6.0, a RCM software package, to
analyze the data (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). RCM is wellsuited for analyzing hierarchically nested data. In the current
study, the 155 projects were nested within 22 project leaders.
Bliese and Hanges (2004) outline several reasons why it is
important to model the hierarchically nested structure of the
observations in multilevel data. First, ignoring the nested
structure of the data results in a failure to model the nonindependence of observations (Bliese and Hanges 2004;
Kenny and Judd 1986). Such an approach assumes that there
is no between-unit variance on the dependent variable. Consequently, resulting standard errors become artificially small,

increasing the likelihood of Type I error (Bliese and Hanges
2004; see also Klein et al. 2000). Second, failure to account
for non-independence can result in inflated variance that leads
to larger standard errors that increase the risk of Type II error
(Bliese and Hanges 2004). Type I and Type II errors pose
serious risks because they lead researchers to draw flawed
conclusions based on the results of their analyses (Bliese and
Hanges 2004; Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Kenny and Judd
1986). HLM and other RCM tools remedy many of the risks
for Type I and Type II errors by explicitly modeling the nonindependence of observations in data.
HLM has been used extensively in the management literature
and is beginning to be used in IS research (e.g., Ang et al.
2002). HLM enables the study of relationships within
hierarchical units and between units simultaneously
(Hofmann 1997). Researchers can examine the effects of
unit-level variables on lower-level outcomes and/or examine
how unit-level variables affect the relationship between two
lower-level variables. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression approaches do not allow a simultaneous examination of
relationships at different levels of analysis. OLS approaches
require researchers to either assume zero between-unit
variance—if one is interested in lower-level relationships—or
assume zero within-unit variance—if one is interested in unitlevel relationships (Klein and Kozlowski 2000). In either
case, important information is lost when variance at one level
is artificially set to zero. In contrast, HLM employs an
empirical Bayes approach to estimate coefficients (Bryk and
Raudenbush 1992). Such an approach uses all of the information available across different levels of analysis. Also,
HLM partitions the variance in the dependent variable into its
lower-level and unit-level components, thus controlling for
nonindependence of error terms (Bliese and Hanges 2004;
Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). The system of equations that
were tested in HLM is shown in Appendix C.

Model Testing
Table 4 presents the results of the model testing. The control
variables relating to project characteristics,3 leader characteristics, and agency factors were entered into the model in
the first block. Relational factors were entered in the second
block, differences in work practices were entered in the third
block, and project leader cultural values were entered in the
final block. Consistent with prior research, all three project

3

Project duration was nonsignificant in all analyses. Therefore, it was
dropped in the interest of model parsimony.
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characteristics had a positive influence on project cost overruns and a negative influence on client satisfaction. The
agency factors, SLA granularity and incentive structures, had
negative effects on cost overruns and a positive influence on
client satisfaction. Finally, project leader experience had a
negative influence on cost overruns and a positive influence
on client satisfaction. These control variables explained 10
percent and 8 percent of the variance in cost overruns and
client satisfaction, respectively.

sample of projects.4 These results relate to block 4 in Table 4.
Only one of the project leader cultural values, namely longterm orientation, had a significant effect on both outcomes.
All other leader cultural values were not significant. The
project leader cultural values explained a modest additional
variance of 3 percent in project cost overruns and client
satisfaction. The results shown in Table 4 are what were
obtained after dropping the nonsignificant values and reestimating the model. Thus, H5 received weak support.

Entering the relational factors into the model explained an
additional 6 percent and 7 percent of the variance in project
cost overruns and client satisfaction, respectively (see Model
2). Model 3, which includes the variables on differences in
work practices, explained an additional 8 percent and 10
percent of the variance in project cost overruns and client
satisfaction over and above Model 2. Consistent with H1, the
participation of a client representative on the team (Client
representative) negatively influenced project cost overruns
(γ100 = –.16, p < .01) and positively influenced client
satisfaction (γ100 = .24, p < .001). Consistent with H2, the
number of client visits to the vendor firm (Clientmeet)
negatively influenced project cost overruns (γ80 = –.14, p <
.01) and positively influenced client satisfaction (γ80 = .16, p
< .05); however, the relationship between the number of team
visits to the client site (Teammeet) and project success was
nonsignificant (γ90 = .04, p = ns; γ90 = .06, p = ns for project
cost overruns and client satisfaction, respectively). As predicted in H3, trust was negatively related to project cost
overruns (γ70 = –.24, p < .001) and positively related to client
satisfaction (γ70 = .26, p < .001).

As noted in the build up to H6, having a client member on a
project team may be insufficient for realizing the benefits of
such a team design. Specifically, we suggested that cultural
differences between the client member and the project leader
could influence the effectiveness with which project teams are
able to carry out their work. Using the sample of 102 projects
with a client representative, we tested H6 by examining the
effects of client member and project leader cultural
differences on the outcome variables. The results of the
analysis are presented in Table 5. Client representative–
project leader cultural differences explained an additional
variance of 13 percent in both cost overruns and client
satisfaction over and above the relational factors and the work
practices differences between the client and vendor. Client
representative–project leader differences on uncertainty
avoidance (γ160 = .15, p < .05), long-term orientation (γ170 =
.17, p < .05), and individualism/collectivism (γ200 = .13, p <
.05) positively influence project cost overruns, while their
differences on uncertainty avoidance (γ160 = –.19, p < .01),
masculinity/femininity (γ190 = –.16, p < .05), and individualism/collectivism (γ200 = –.14, p < .05) negatively
influence client satisfaction, thus supporting H6.

H4 predicted that differences in work practices between the
client and vendor firms would negatively influence project
success. Three of the five work practice cultural differences
variables played a role in the direction predicted: Process
(γ110 = .13, p < .05), Open (γ140 = .16, p < .05), and
Normative (γ160 = .14, p < .05) for project cost overruns; and
Process (γ110 = –.16, p < .05), Open (γ140 = –.15, p < .05), and
Normative (γ160 = –.12, p < .05) for client satisfaction. The
positive coefficients in the case of project cost overruns and
the negative coefficients in the case of client satisfaction
support H4 as larger values represent greater differences on
each cultural norm. Thus, H4 is partially supported.

An interesting observation is that, although the power
distance differential is high, it does not play a significant role
in predicting either cost overruns or client satisfaction,
perhaps because the project leaders are quite deferential given
the high power distance score among the project leaders. The
large differences in individualism/collectivism and long-term
orientation play a role in influencing one or both outcomes.
Although the differences in uncertainty avoidance and
masculinity/femininity are substantially smaller than the other
differences, these differences influence the outcomes, with the
former influencing both outcomes. Overall, this suggests that
cultural differences, with the exception of power distance,
both big and small, influence objective (cost overruns) and
subjective (client satisfaction) measures of offshore IS project
success.

H5 predicted that project leader cultural values would be
important for ensuring project success. To test this hypothesis, we examined the relationship between project leader
cultural values and the two outcome variables in the entire
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Table 4. HLM Model Predicting Cost Overruns and Satisfaction (N = 155)
Cost Overruns

Client Satisfaction

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

R²

.10

.16

.24

.27

.08

.15

.25

.28

ΔR²

.10

.06

.08

.03

.08

.07

.10

.03

γ

γ

γ

γ

γ

γ

γ

γ

Block 1:
Project Characteristics
Project complexity (γ10)

.17* (.020)

.15* (.021)

.14* (.022)

.14* (.022)

–.14* (.028)

–.13* (.030)

–.10 (.032)

–.08 (.033)

Requirements uncertainty (γ20)

.18* (.022)

.17* (.023)

.08 (.024)

.08 (.024)

–.17* (.025)

–.15* (.026)

–.08 (.028)

–.08 (.028)

Project size (γ30)

.21** (.027)

.20** (.029)

.14* (.030)

.14* (.030)

–.19** (.031)

.16* (.032)

.13* (.033)

.13* (.033)

–.13* (.020)

.08 (.022)

.05 (.023)

.15 (.023)

.14* (.021)

.05 (.022)

.03 (.023)

.03 (.023)

–.13* (.028)

.07 (.029)

.05 (.030)

.05 (.023)

.14* (.021)

.05 (.022)

.03 (.023)

.03 (.023)

–.20** (.028)

–.20** (.029)

.15* (.027)

.14* (.028)

.05 (.029)

.04 (.030)

Project Leader Characteristics
Project leader experience (γ01)
Agency Factors
Service level agreements (γ40)
Risk sharing (γ50)

–.28*** (.020) –.25*** (.027)

Block 2: Relational Factors
Firm history (γ60)

–.10 (.024)

–.07 (.025)

–.06 (.026)

.16* (.012)

.14* (014)

.14* (.014)

–.24*** (.020)

–.20** (.023)

–.19** (.023)

.26*** (.016)

.21** (.017)

.21** (.017)

Clientmeet (γ80)

–.14* (.017)

–.13* (.018)

–.13* (.018)

.16* (.018)

.15* (.017)

.15* (.017)

Teammeet (γ90)

.04 (.023)

.04 (.025)

.04 (.026)

.06 (.020)

.05 (.021)

.05 (.020)

–.16** (.019)

–.16** (.019)

–.15* (.018)

.24*** (.020)

.24*** (.020)

.24*** (.020)

Trust (γ70)

Client representative (γ100)

Block 3: Vendor–Client Firm Work Practices Differences
ΔProcess (γ110)

.13* (.015)

.13* (.015)

–.16* (.021)

–.15* (.020)

ΔEmployee (γ120)

.04 (.023)

.04 (.025)

.02 (.011)

.02 (.013)

ΔParochial (γ130)

.05 (.021)

.05 (.022)

.07 (.024)

.07 (.023)

ΔOpen (γ140)

.16* (.018)

.15* (.018)

–.15* (.019)

–.14* (.020)

ΔLoose (γ150)

.03 (.018)

.03 (.017)

.02 (.024)

.00 (.025)

ΔNormative (γ160)

.14* (.017)

.13* (.017)

–.12* (.023)

–.12* (.023)

Block 4: Project Leader Cultural Values
Uncertainty avoidance (γ02)

NS

NS

Long-term orientation (γ03)

–.13* (.010)

.13** (.011)

Power distance (γ04)

NS

NS

Masculinity (γ05)

NS

NS

Individualism (γ06)

NS

NS

Notes:
1.
Italicized variables are controls. Client representative: 1 = client representation 0 = no client representation; Clientmeet: number of client visits; Teammeet:
number of team visits to client; Δ: absolute difference (e.g., ΔProcess: client–vendor difference in process orientation); Standard errors are in parentheses.
2.
Level-1, n = 155; level-2, n = 22.
3.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Table 5. HLM Model Predicting Cost Overruns and Satisfaction: Projects with Client
Representation (N = 102)
Cost Overruns

Client Satisfaction

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

R²

.12

.20

.27

.40

.11

.20

.28

.41

ΔR²

.12

.08

.07

.13

.11

.09

.08

.13

γ

γ

γ

γ

γ

γ

γ

γ

Block 1:
Project Characteristics
Project complexity (γ10)

.18* (.027)

.15* (.030)

.16* (.030)

.14* (.031)

–.15* (.025)

–.13* (.028)

.12* (.028)

.12* (.028)

Requirements uncertainty (γ20)

.18** (.021)

.16* (.023)

.17* (.023)

.14* (.024)

–.18** (.020)

–.16* (.023)

–.15* (.025)

–.15* (.025)

Project size (γ30)

.21** (.021)

.17** (.024)

.17** (.024)

.15* (.026)

–.18** (.022)

–.15* (.022)

–.14* (.024)

–.14* (.024)

–.13* (.018)

.03 (.022)

.03 (.022)

.04 (.023)

.13* (.014)

.13* (.014)

.03 (.022)

.01 (.023)

–.15* (.021)

–.14* (.028)

–.14* (.028)

–.13* (.029)

Project Leader Characteristics
Project leader experience (γ01)
Agency Factors
Service level agreements (γ40)
Risk sharing (γ50)

–.29*** (.020) –.27*** (.022) –.26*** (.023) –.25*** (.026)

.16* (.020)

.16* (.020)

.15* (.022)

.14* (.023)

.20** (.021)

.20** (.021)

.18** (.022)

.17* (.024)

Block 2: Relational Factors
Firm history (γ60)

–.03 (.023)

.18* (.012)

.15* (.014)

.13* (.015)

Trust (γ70)

–.28*** (.018) –.22*** (.018)

–.03 (.022)

–.03 (.022)

–.18** (.020)

.29*** (.012)

.26*** (.014)

.21** (.017)

Clientmeet (γ80)

–.17** (.019)

–.14* (.019)

–.13* (.020)

.17** (.012)

.16* (.013)

.14* (.015)

Teammeet (γ90)

.04 (.011)

.03 (.011)

.02 (.012)

.03 (.009)

.03 (.009)

.02 (.010)

Block 3: Vendor–Client Firm Work Practices Differences
ΔProcess (γ100)

.15* (.014)

.14* (.013)

–.16* (.013)

–.15* (.014)

ΔEmployee (γ110)

.03 (.020)

.02 (.018)

–.15* (.010)

–.14* (.013)

ΔParochial (γ120)

.03 (.010)

.02 (.012)

–.03 (.018)

–.02 (.020)

.19** (.013)

.16* (.015)

–.16* (.018)

–.15* (.019)

ΔOpen (γ130)
ΔLoose (γ140)

.03 (.010)

.04 (.012)

–.03 (.010)

–.02 (.014)

ΔNormative (γ150)

.14* (.016)

.13* (.017)

–.17* (.014)

–.14* (.015)

Block 4: Project Leader Cultural Values
ΔUncertainty avoidance (γ160)

.15* (.010)

–.19** (.010)

ΔLong-term orientation (γ170)

.17* (.011)

NS

ΔPower distance (γ180)

NS

NS

ΔMasculinity (γ190)

NS

–.16* (.014)

.13* (.011)

–.14* (.012)

ΔIndividualism (γ200)

Notes:
1.
Italicized variables are controls. Clientmeet: number of client visits; Teammeet: number of team visits to client; Δ: absolute difference (e.g., ΔProcess: client–
vendor difference in process orientation; ΔUncertainty avoidance: client representative-project leader difference on espoused uncertainty avoidance); Standard
errors are in parentheses.
2.
Level-1, n = 102; level-2, n = 22.
3.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Post Hoc Analysis
Given the weak support for H5 and given that we theorized
that it was the cultural differences (project leader versus client
representative), rather than the project leader cultural values,
that played a role when a client representative was present, we
conducted a post hoc analysis to determine the conditions
under which project leader cultural values might have an
impact. To accomplish this, we examined the cross-level
effects of project leader cultural values in the 102 projects
with a client representative. There were no significant crosslevel effects for project leader cultural values. We then
examined the cross-level effects of project leader cultural
values using the subsample of projects without client
representation (n = 53) and found significant results. This
suggests possible cross-level moderation such that the
leader’s cultural values are significant in the absence of a
client representative on the project team and nonsignificant
otherwise. We also tested the interaction of Client representative and cultural values of the project leader using the
pooled data (n = 155) and found a similar pattern.
Table 6 presents the results of the analysis and Appendix D
reports the correlations for the subsample of projects with no
client representative. While much of these results were
similar to what was observed in Table 4, the key differences
were observed in the importance of various project leader
cultural values. The project leader cultural values explain an
additional 11 percent and 12 percent of the variance (beyond
what was explained by control variables, relational factors,
and work practices differences) in project cost overruns and
client satisfaction respectively. As illustrated in Model 3 of
Table 6, project leader uncertainty avoidance (γ02 = .16, p <
.05), long-term orientation (γ03 = –.13, p < .05), and
masculinity/femininity (γ05 = –.17, p < .05) have significant
cross-level effects on project cost overruns. Project leader
uncertainty avoidance (γ02 = .18, p < .01), long-term orientation (γ03 = .16, p < .05), and power distance (γ04 = .14, p < .05)
have significant cross-level effects on client satisfaction.
With the exception of the positive coefficient for uncertainty
avoidance, the other significant coefficients are in the direction we might expect. Overall, based on these results, we can
conclude that in the absence of client representation on the
team, project leader espoused cultural values are related to
offshore IS project success.

Discussion
The objective of this research was to enhance our understanding of offshore IS project success by incorporating the

role of relational and cultural factors. We sought to achieve
this objective by integrating the social embeddedness perspective into the IS offshoring literature. Our results provide
evidence that offshore IS projects should be managed with a
systematic emphasis on relational and cultural factors in
addition to a focus on factors derived from agency theory.
These relational and cultural factors establish a social context
for effective collaboration. Cultural factors—at the level of
partnering firms and of project leader and client representative—must be actively managed to increase the success of
offshore IS projects. The insights and theoretical contributions that emerge from our study relate to how and why
(1) relational factors augment the role of economic contractual mechanisms and project characteristics in achieving
IS offshore project success; (2) team leaders’ espoused
cultural values influence success; (3) differences in organizational cultural norms between the client and vendor firm
hinders success; and (4) differences in espoused cultural
values between team leader and client representative on the
team impedes success for projects with a client representative.

Theoretical Contributions
This research makes several important contributions to the IS
offshoring literature. It demonstrates that offshore IS projects
should not be managed with a focus on agency factors only.
It brings together the relational and cultural perspectives to
enrich the social embeddedness perspective and generate
complementary insights on how offshore IS projects should
be managed. It identifies the role of relational factors,
cultural values of the project leader, and cultural differences
at the organizational and team levels. We highlight each of
these contributions next.
Role of Relational Factors
Our results indicate that the management of offshore IS
projects should not be limited to dealing with agency concerns of self-interested behavior but must be augmented to
embed economic client–vendor interactions in a supportive
relational context. While agency factors and project characteristics enhance offshore IS project success, they explain a
limited proportion of variance in cost overruns and client
satisfaction. In fact, the results show that the addition of
relational factors to the set of project characteristics and
agency factors significantly enhances the variance explained
in offshore IS project success (ΔR2 = .06 for cost overruns;
ΔR2 = .07 for client satisfaction). Thus, these results demonstrate the importance of managing the relational context in
which the client and vendor exchange information and knowledge, solve problems, and make decisions.
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Table 6. HLM Model Predicting Cost Overruns and Satisfaction: Projects with No Client
Representation (N = 53)
Cost Overruns

Client Satisfaction

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

R²

.10

.24

.35

.10

.25

.37

ΔR²

.10

.14

.11

.10

.15

.12

γ

γ

γ

γ

γ

γ

Block 1:

Model 3

Project Characteristics
Project complexity (γ10)

.16* (.030)

.15* (.030)

.15* (.030)

–.14* (.027)

–.13* (.028)

.12* (.028)

Requirements uncertainty (γ20)

.17** (.022)

.16* (.023)

.14* (.025)

–.17** (.020)

–.16* (.023)

–.15* (.025)

Project size (γ30)

.20** (.022)

.17** (.024)

.14* (.025)

–.18** (.021)

–.15* (.022)

–.14* (.024)

–.12* (.017)

.04 (.022)

.05 (.022)

.12* (.015)

.02 (.021)

.01 (.022)

Project Leader Characteristics
Project leader experience (γ01)
Agency Factors
Service level agreements (γ40)
Risk sharing (γ50)

–.13* (.028)

–.12* (.029)

–.13* (.029)

.15* (.026)

.14* (.029)

.13* (.029)

–.27*** (.027)

–.23*** (.028)

–.24*** (.028)

.21** (.018)

.19** (.019)

.17* (.020)

Block 2: Relational Factors and Vendor–Client Work Practices Differences
Firm history (γ60)

–.02 (.017)

–.02 (.018)

.13* (.015)

.12* (.018)

–.24*** (.019)

–.20** (.021)

.24*** (.015)

.20** (.018)

Clientmeet (γ80)

–.15* (.020)

–.14* (.021)

.14* (.013)

.13* (.015)

Teammeet (γ90)

.02 (.010)

.01 (.010)

.03 (.010)

.01 (.012)

ΔProcess (γ100)

.16* (.014)

.15* (.015)

–.15* (.013)

–.14* (.015)

ΔEmployee (γ110)

.04 (.020)

.02 (.018)

–.14* (.011)

–.13* (.013)

ΔParochial (γ120)

.05 (.018)

.04 (.015)

–.05 (.018)

–.04 (.019)

.18** (.017)

.15* (.018)

–.16* (.018)

–.15* (.019)

Trust (γ70)

ΔOpen (γ130)
ΔLoose (γ140)

.03 (.010)

.03 (.011)

–.03 (.010)

–.03 (.011)

ΔNormative (γ150)

.14* (.016)

.13* (.018)

–.16* (.015)

–.14* (.018)

Block 3: Project Leader Cultural Values
Uncertainty avoidance (γ02)

.16* (.021)

.18** (.018)

Long-term orientation (γ03)

–.13* (.014)

.16* (.013)

.04 (.020)

.14* (.017)

–.17* (.013)

.07 (.014)

.02 (.013)

.01 (.012)

Power distance (γ04)
Masculinity (γ05)
Individualism (γ06)

Notes:
1.
Italicized variables are controls. Clientmeet: number of client visits; Teammeet: number of team visits to client; Δ: absolute difference (e.g., ΔProcess: client–
vendor difference in process orientation); Standard errors are in parentheses.
2.
Level-1, n = 53; level-2, n = 22.
3.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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In terms of specific relational mechanisms, our results
indicate that the success of offshore IS projects is enhanced
by client representation on project teams, information
exchange through client visits to the vendor site, and
governance based on client trust in the vendor. The results
point to the importance of active immersion by the client in
the organizational context of the vendor in which development work occurs. However, our results do not provide
evidence that vendor visits to the client firm impact offshore
IS project success. This is possibly because vendor visits to
the client site may tend to be more scripted, may involve a
subset of the team, and may not receive the full attention of
the client due to the natural demands and interruptions that are
likely to occur in the day-to-day work environment. Finally,
client trust in the vendor enhances the success of offshore IS
projects, as it creates the conditions for fine-grained information exchange without fear of opportunism. Thus,
although some of these relational mechanisms represent costs,
such as those incurred from travel by the client to the vendor
site, they are effective investments that pay off by reducing
cost overruns and increasing client satisfaction.

Role of Differences in Work Practices Between
Client and Vendor Firms
Our results provide evidence that shared norms between
partnering firms contribute to the success of offshore IS
projects above and beyond the effect of the three relational
factors of joint problem solving, information exchange, and
trust. The inclusion of shared norms in our model further
increased the explained variance by 8 percent for cost overruns and by 10 percent for client satisfaction. Specifically, we
found that offshore IS project success is influenced by
differences between the client and vendor on three norms:
(1) organization of work being oriented toward processes or
results; (2) communication climate being open or closed; and
(3) internal control being loose or tight. Differences on the
other norms related to employee versus job orientation,
parochialism versus professionalism, and normativeness
versus pragmatism were not found to significantly impact cost
overruns or client satisfaction.
The findings suggest that differences between the client and
vendor in how work is organized—process-oriented versus
result-oriented—compounds the difficulties of coordination
of activities for requirement specification, software design,
and testing. While process-oriented firms prefer to establish
detailed processes and interaction routines to coordinate work
with their partner, result-oriented firms will prefer to negotiate
roles and responsibilities for outcomes with their partner. The

findings also reveal that organizational culture differences
related to communication climate and internal control facilitates offshore IS project success. The social embeddedness
perspective underscores the critical role of fine-grained information exchange between the client and vendor for feedback
and learning. A climate of open communication on both sides
should facilitate such transfer. Similarly, alignment of norms
for internal control reduces conflicts around decision rights
being tightly allocated or loosely managed. Thus, similarity
between the client and vendor firm on these three cultural
norms significantly aligns practices related to work processes,
communication, and control, thereby reducing misunderstanding, conflict, and errors.
Role of Project Leader Cultural Values
We suggested that cultural factors are important in the IS
offshoring context, not just at the macro level of differences
in work practices between the two partnering firms, but also
at the level of the project team. We suggested that project
leader cultural values would influence the success of offshore
IS projects. Our results provide only minimal support for this
general relationship (ΔR2 = .03), with only one project leader
cultural value—namely, long-term orientation—being significant. However, our post hoc analysis examining projects
without a client representative showed that project leader
cultural values are indeed important. In the absence of a
client representative as a steward of the client firm’s interests,
the project leader plays a critical role in the overall management and ultimate success of offshore IS projects.
Specifically, our analysis of the 53 projects with no client
representative revealed three project leader cultural values—
namely, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and
masculinity/feminity—had significant cross-level effects on
cost overruns (ΔR2 = .11) and client satisfaction (ΔR2 = .12).
In contrast, none of the project leader cultural characteristics
was significant in the sample of 102 projects with a client
representative.

Role of Differences in Cultural Values Between
Client Representative and Project Leader
We suggested that cultural values also play an instrumental
role in shaping the success of offshore IS projects that have a
client representative on the team. In this case, consideration
must be given to differences in cultural values between the
client representative and project leader. Our results support
this perspective, as the inclusion of project leader cultural
values in addition to relational factors and differences in work
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practices factors did not explain any significant additional
variance in success. In contrast, four of the five difference
measures between the client representative and project leader
on these espoused cultural values significantly relate to one or
both measures of IS offshore project success. In fact, the
inclusion of these cultural differences increased the explained
variance by 13 percent for cost overruns and by 13 percent for
client satisfaction over and above relational factors and work
practice differences.
The findings suggest that differences between the client
representative and project leader on uncertainty avoidance
increased cost overruns and decreased client satisfaction.
This difference is likely to result in lack of a shared mental
model and possibly create conflict related to the extent of
advanced planning to be undertaken, the rigidity with which
plans need to be adhered, and the utility of day-to-day
monitoring. Client representative–project leader differences
on individualism/collectivism increased cost overruns and
reduced client satisfaction. This difference is likely to surface
in their disparate views on how team work is to be organized,
managed, and rewarded. Differences between the client
representative and project leader on long-term orientation
increased cost overruns, but was not related to client satisfaction. This difference between client representative and
project leader can lead to disagreements about outcomes and
processes, and possibly the pursuit of misaligned actions.
Finally, a disparity in masculinity/femininity did not lead to
cost overruns but decreased client satisfaction. It likely
creates disagreements on the implications of gender for the
assignment of roles and responsibilities in projects.

Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research
Some positive features of the study lend credibility to the
reported findings. We used multiple sources of data (i.e.,
survey data and archival project documents). Thus, concerns
about common method variance are allayed. As noted earlier,
we employed a total cost measure of development costs to
compute cost overruns. The total cost considered expenses
beyond billed man-hours. Additionally, the data were collected longitudinally, a positive feature of the study design.
Finally, we focused on projects that required development of
strategic solutions that are customized rather than those that
require minor reconfiguration of previously developed
modules. Such a focus leads us to insights that are applicable
to contexts where the requirements expertise and systems
development expertise that are distributed across onshore
clients and offshore vendors must be integrated across cultural
boundaries.
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Just as there are positive aspects of the study, there are also
limitations that should be acknowledged. For practical
reasons, our study was limited to one vendor firm in India,
which enabled us to test the hypotheses with a limited sample
of projects relative to the number of variables. Also, we
empirically tested the model only with data related to software
development projects offshored from the United States to
India. It is possible that some of the findings observed here
are idiosyncratic to these contextual features. Future research
should examine the extent to which our findings generalize to
other types of offshoring projects and other countries (e.g.,
Japanese projects offshored to India; Japanese projects
offshored to China). Within-country regional cultures may
also be an important consideration for future research. A
more complete understanding of offshoring requires additional multilevel studies that elaborate on the context of action
and the interplay of institutions that operate in multiple social
spaces (Avgerou 2002). Such studies will enable us to more
fully understand how to integrate knowledge that is locally
embedded (Nicholson and Sahay 2004). It is quite likely that
the effects of team and organizational cultural factors would
be relevant for onshore outsourced IS projects as well. While
client–vendor cultural differences might be less pronounced
in onshore outsourced IS projects, compared to offshored IS
projects, the examination of the effects of such differences
can help us better understand success in IS outsourcing.
In terms of client–vendor interactions, we considered two
forms of face-to-face meetings: client representatives visiting
the vendor and the vendor team visiting the client. We did
not evaluate other forms of interaction, such as teleconferencing, phone calls, e-mails, and online chat sessions, for
three reasons: some data were not captured by the vendor as
it was complex to do so or was against company policy; some
data that were captured were not archived by project; and
some captured data were not shared with us for privacy and
confidentiality reasons. Prior research points to the importance of communication media choice for effective team
collaboration (Dennis et al. 2008; Maruping and Agarwal
2004). Thus, future research should evaluate the role of both
face-to-face meetings and virtual interactions in offshore IS
projects. More importantly, such research should attempt to
capture the content of client–vendor interactions.
From the standpoint of cultural characteristics within offshore
IS project teams, it will be important to understand the
performance implications of teams composed of members
from the same country liaising with a client representative
also from the same country (Cox et al. 1991; Earley 1993;
Watson et al. 1993). Attention could be devoted to surfacelevel (e.g., gender, age, race) and deep-level (e.g., person-
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ality) similarities among vendor team members, leader, client
representative, and client liaison and their effects on cost
overruns and client satisfaction (Harrison et al. 1998;
Harrison et al. 2002). Other research on culture in teams
suggests that the creation of hybrid cultures within teams may
mitigate conflicts that result from cultural differences (e.g.,
Earley and Mosakowski 2000). A fine-grained view of trust
would also yield insights into the effects of such hybrid
cultures. Our study only examined client trust in the vendor
and did not distinguish between benevolence, integrity, and
ability based dimensions (Mayer et al. 1995). Building on
such prior research, future research could investigate surfaceversus deep-level diversity and its effects on cost overruns vs.
versus maintenance costs.
Our interest and emphasis was on two important outcomes
related to projects: project cost overruns and client satisfaction. Other relevant outcomes should be studied. Team
camaraderie is one such outcome (Hackman 1987). As team
members will surely work on multiple projects together over
time, it is important to understand the team structure and
leader’s cultural values that promote team camaraderie in the
form of high team cohesion and satisfaction. In particular, it
will be important to know if team structures and cultural
values create suboptimal team camaraderie. While we
examined project cost overruns by considering client and
vendor expenses, we did not examine maintenance costs.
Future research should evaluate the tension between cost
overruns and maintenance costs associated with bugs and bug
fixes. The focus on cost overruns is, of course, important.
However, understanding the implications of such factors for
maintenance costs in light of lower/higher cost overruns will
help develop a more complete picture of offshore IS project
success from the perspectives of the vendor and client. Future
research should also examine value for money as an important
outcome variable. Our measure of client satisfaction does not
necessarily tap into this aspect of offshore IS project outcomes. Value for money may very well be linked to the
tension between cost overruns and maintenance costs.

Practical Implications
The findings from this work have significant implications for
the widely prevalent practice of offshoring IS projects from
the United States to India. First, it is clear that while project
characteristics and agency factors help contain cost overruns
and increase client satisfaction, more can be done to improve
these key outcomes. Based on our work, it is evident that
firms wanting to leverage offshoring should create structures
for jointly engaging in problem solving, establish mechanisms
for fine-grained information transfer, and develop the trust of

the client. They should strongly consider assigning a client
representative to the project team and to undertake site visits
to the vendor site. While these bridging initiatives require
investments, they yield significant returns via reduced cost
overruns and increased client satisfaction.
Second, firms entering into offshore agreements should
proactively evaluate the work norms of the vendor relative to
their own. They should especially examine if the vendor’s
practices—related to the organization of work, communications, and controls—are compatible with their practices.
These practices, if misaligned, are likely to exacerbate
coordination costs, lead to conflict, and hurt the progress and
outcomes of these projects. To tackle potential problems that
might arise from misalignment, client and vendor firms should
strive to develop negotiated work cultures that give both
parties a common base from which to operate (Earley and
Mosakowski 2000; Krishna et al. 2004).
Third and finally, the client and vendor firm should determine
key memberships on the project team. If a client representative is to be assigned, which we noted earlier as desirable,
the differences in espoused cultural values between the
representative and the project team leader should be assessed.
Dissimilarities in cultural values should be minimized, as they
create incompatibilities that are likely to surface in interaction
and management style, assumptions made, and priorities that
are pursued. Krishna et al. (2004) recommend the use of
expatriates who can bridge cultures when such staffing
decisions are made. However, if a client representative is not
to be assigned, the espoused cultural values of the project
leader should be considered. Those individuals with properties of high power distance and long-term orientation can
enhance the likelihood of success of the project. However,
caution should be taken in overemphasizing the uncertainty
avoidance characteristic, as such project leaders may be
intransigent on courses of action once plans have been
formulated, even though some client members may find rigid
adherence to plans appealing.
In sum, it is instructive to reinforce that the social embeddedness perspective enhances our understanding of cost overruns and client satisfaction in offshore IS projects, above and
beyond what is explained by project characteristics and
agency factors. This is particularly informative for practitioners, as our cost overruns measure considers billed manhours incurred by vendor team members and other expenses
incurred by the client and the vendor, thus considering additional coordination costs incurred in offshore IS projects.
Additionally, practitioners should benefit from understanding
how relational factors can be used to enhance client satisfaction.
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Conclusions
We contribute to the IS offshoring literature by integrating
multiple theoretical perspectives to understand how offshore
IS projects should be successfully managed. Drawing on the
social embeddedness literature, we identified three relational
mechanisms—namely, client visits to the vendor site, client
representation on the team, and open architectures for
governance—as important predictors of offshore IS project
success. Further, contingencies were identified relating to the
influence of cultural factors—namely, differences in clientvendor firm work practices, project leader cultural values, and
differences in cultural values between client representativeproject leader—on project success. Taken together, these
findings contribute to the IS offshoring literature and extend
the social embeddedness perspective. They demonstrate that
an agency perspective is inadequate to manage offshore IS
projects and that a holistic perspective that also focuses on
relational mechanisms and cultural considerations is imperative. The findings have important implications for practice by
providing guidance on how best to select the vendor, assign
the leader and client representative, and design the team structure and client–vendor interaction to achieve project success.
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Appendix A
Project Illustration
Background of the Offshore Project
The offshore vendor firm in India was contracted by a client firm in the United States, which operates in the automobile sector, to develop a
multiuser decision support system. The client firm had not previously contracted the services of the offshore vendor. The system being
developed was of strategic importance to the customer as its core business processes related to planning and management of vendors were
enabled by this information system. Given the strategic nature of the project, the project complexity was high, based on an assessment of use
cases and adjusted function points. The project was budgeted for nearly 150,000 man hours of development time and was projected to take
about four months to complete with 30 consultants and analysts assigned to the project. To accommodate for the requirements uncertainty,
a total of 20 formal written changes were made to the contract.
In terms of project outcomes, there was a total cost overrun of 15 percent for billed man-hours for the development effort; and 22 percent
additional expenditures incurred by the client above and beyond the negotiated billed expenses for specialized software, training, conferences,
and visits to sites of customers or partners of the client firm. The project took a little under five months to complete. The client satisfaction,
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measured four months after the completion of the project, was 3.8 on a scale of 1 to 7.

Contractual Characteristics
The project was monitored using a moderate level of detail for SLAs that were specified in the contract. Examples of these SLAs included
budgeted versus actual man hours and monthly reporting. In addition, the contract type is best described as one focused on time and materials.

Relational Exchange Characteristics
The client firm’s score for trust in the vendor was 4.2 on the 1 to 7 scale. To facilitate coordination, a client representative of U.S. origin was
assigned by the client firm to the project, and spent 20 percent of his time at the site in India. To facilitate discussions on critical issues and
information exchange, the client visited the project team two times. During the project, an average of three project team members visited the
client site two times.

Vendor–Client Firm Work Practices Differences
Based on the three-item scales for each of the six dimensions of organizational work practices, the scores for the client and vendor firm are
shown below.
Work Practices Norms
Process versus result orientation
Employee versus job orientation
Parochialism versus professionalism
Open versus closed system
Loose versus tight control
Normative versus pragmatic orientation

Client

Vendor

4.1
4.4
3.8
4.7
5.0
4.0

5.2
4.7
3.9
3.9
5.2
5.1

As can be seen, the firms are quite similar with respect to three of the six practices. The largest differences were in the areas of process versus
result orientation, open versus closed system, and normative versus pragmatic orientation.

Project Leader Cultural Values and Differences with Client Representative
A female project leader was assigned to manage the project. The project leader had significant project management experience, having
managed 12 completed projects prior to this engagement. The cultural values of the project leader and the client representative, and their
differences, based on Hofstede’s 100-point scale—as specified in the VSM 94 manual—are shown below.
Espoused Cultural Values
Uncertainty avoidance
Long-term orientation
Power distance
Individualism/collectivism
Masculinity/femininity

Project
Leader

Client
Representative

42
64
52
44
55

64
29
46
80
60

As can be seen, the project leader and the client representative are quite similar with respect to two of the five values. The largest differences
between them are in the areas of uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and individualism/collectivism.

A2
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Appendix B
Scales
Organizational Work Practices (Hofstede et al. 1990); 100-point scale (e.g., 0 = process-oriented; 100 = result-oriented)—the score for each
practice is the average of the response to each of the three items.
Process-oriented versus Result-oriented
1. Comfortable in unfamiliar situations.
2. Each day brings new challenges.
3. People put in maximal effort.
Employee-oriented versus Job-oriented
1. Important decisions made by individuals.
2. Organization only interested in work people do.
2. Little concern for personal problems of employees.
Parochial versus Professional
1. People’s private life is their own business.
2. Job competence is only criterion in hiring people.
3. Think three years ahead or more.
Open System versus Closed System
1. Only very special people fit in organization.
2. Organization and people closed and secretive.
3. New employees need more than a year to feel at home.
Loose Control versus Tight Control
1. Everybody cost-conscious.
2. Meeting times kept punctually.
3. Always speak seriously of organization and job.
Normative versus Pragmatic
1. Pragmatic, not dogmatic in matters of ethics.
2. Major emphasis on meeting customer needs.
3. Results more important than procedures.
Interorganizational Trust (Aulakh et al. 1996); Anchors: 1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree.
1. Our business relationship with [vendor name] is characterized by high levels of trust.
2. Our firm and [vendor name] generally trust each other that each will stay within the terms of the contract.
3. We and [vendor name] are generally skeptical of the information provided to each other. (reverse coded)
Client Satisfaction (Nidumolu 1995); Anchors: 1 = Very Poor; 7 = Very Good.
1. Ease of use of software.
2. Ability to customize outputs to various user needs.
3. Range of outputs that can be generated.
4. Overall responsiveness of software to users.
Espoused Cultural Values (Hofstede’s VSM94); 100-point scale
Calculations:
Note that, mathematically, it is possible for the values to be below 0 and above 100.
Uncertainty avoidance = 25(item1) + 20(item2) – 50(item3) – 15(item4) + 120
Long-term orientation = 45(item1) – 30(item2) – 35(item3) + 15(item4) + 67
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Power distance = –35(item1) + 35(item2) + 25(item3) – 20(item4) – 20
Individualism = –50(item1) + 30(item2) + 20(item3) – 25(item4) + 130
Masculinity = 60(item1) – 20(item2) + 20(item3) – 70(item4) + 100
a
Measured on a 5-point Likert scale: 1 = very seldom; 5 = very frequently.
b
Measured on a 5-point Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.
c
Measured on a 5-point Likert scale: 1 = of utmost importance; 5 = of very little or no importance.
d
Measured on a 5-point Likert scale: 1 = never; 5 = always.
Uncertainty Avoidance (0 = weak uncertainty avoidance; 100 = strong uncertainty avoidance)
1. How often do you feel nervous at work?a
2. One can be a good manager without having precise answers to most questions that subordinates may raise about their work.b
3. Competition between employees usually does more harm than good.b
4. A company’s or organization’s rules should not be broken—not even when the employee thinks it is in the company’s best interest.b
Long-term Orientation (0 = very short-term oriented; 100 = very long-term oriented)
In your private life, how important is each of the following to you?
1. Personal steadiness and stability.c
2. Thrift.c
3. Persistence (perseverance).c
4. Respect for tradition.c
Power Distance (0 = small power distance; 100 = large power distance)
1. In your job, how important would it be to you to have a good working relationship with your direct superior?c
2. In your job, how important would it be to you to be consulted by your direct superior in his/her decisions?c
3. In your experience, how frequently are subordinates afraid to express disagreement with their superiors?d
4. An organization’s structure in which certain subordinates have two bosses should be avoided at all costs.b
Individualism/collectivism (0 = strongly collectivist; 100 = strongly individualist)
1. In your job, how important would it be to you to have sufficient time for your personal or family life?c
2. In your job, how important would it be to you to have good physical working conditions?c
3. In your job, how important would it be to you to have security of employment?c
4. In your job, how important would it be to you to have an element of variety and adventure in the job?c
Masculinity/femininity (0 = strongly feminine; 100 = strongly masculine)
1. In your job, how important would it be to you to work well with people who cooperate well with one another?c
2. In your job, how important would it be to you to have an opportunity for advancement to higher level jobs?c
3. Most people can be trusted.b
4. When people have failed in life it is often their own fault.b

Appendix C
Equations
The dependent variables—cost overrunsij and client satisfactionij—represent the outcomes for project i under project leader j. The
intercepts are estimated separately for each project leader as indicated by the subscript j for each beta coefficient (β). The level-1
residual is noted by rij (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Hofmann 1997). The gamma coefficients (γ) are similar to beta coefficients,
except that they are at level-2 and are estimated using a generalized least squares (GLS) approach (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992).
Finally, U0j is a level-2 residual. As the equations below indicate, β0j, was allowed to randomly vary so that we could test the crosslevel main effects.
The equations for the results presented in Table 4 are outlined below. Note that the equations used to predict cost overruns and
client satisfaction are the same. In the interest of brevity, we present the equations for cost overruns.
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Model 1
Level-1:
Cost overrunsij = β0j + β1j Project complexity + β2j Requirements uncertainty + β3j Project size + β4j Service level agreements + β5j
Risk sharing + rij
Level-2:
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Project leader experience + U0j; β1j = γ10; β2j = γ20; β3j = γ30; β4j = γ40; β5j = γ50
Model 2
Level-1:
Cost overrunsij = β0j + β1j Project complexity + β2j Requirements uncertainty + β3j Project size + β4j Service level agreements + β5j
Risk sharing + β6j Firm history + β7j Trust + β8j Clientmeet + β9j Teammeet + β10j Client representative + rij
Level-2:
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Project leader experience + U0j; β1j = γ10; β2j = γ20; β3j = γ30; β4j = γ40; β5j = γ50; β6j = γ60; β7j = γ70; β8j = γ80; β9j = γ90; β10j
= γ100
Model 3
Level-1:
Cost overrunsij = β0j + β1j Project complexity + β2j Requirements uncertainty + β3j Project size + β4j Service level agreements + β5j
Risk sharing + β6j Firm history + β7j Trust + β8j Clientmeet + β9j Teammeet + β10j Client representative + β11j ΔProcess + β12j
ΔEmployee + β13j ΔParochial + β14j ΔOpen + β15j ΔLoose + β16j ΔNormative + rij
Level-2:
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Project leader experience + U0j; β1j = γ10; β2j = γ20; β3j = γ30; β4j = γ40; β5j = γ50; β6j = γ60; β7j = γ70; β8j = γ80; β9j = γ90; β10j
= γ100; β11j = γ110; β12j = γ120; β13j = γ130; β14j = γ140; β15j = γ150; β16j = γ160
Model 4
Level-1:
Cost overrunsij = β0j + β1j Project complexity + β2j Requirements uncertainty + β3j Project size + β4j Service level agreements + β5j
Risk sharing + β6j Firm history + β7j Trust + β8j Clientmeet + β9j Teammeet + β10j Client representation + β11j Process + β12j
ΔEmployee + β13j ΔParochial + β14j ΔOpen + β15j ΔLoose + β16j ΔNormative + rij
Level-2:
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Project leader experience + γ02 Uncertainty avoidance + γ03 Long-term orientation + γ04 Power distance + γ05
Masculinity + γ06 Individualism + U0j; β1j = γ10; β2j = γ20; β3j = γ30; β4j = γ40; β5j = γ50; β6j = γ60; β7j = γ70; β8j = γ80; β9j = γ90; β10j = γ100; β11j
= γ110; β12j = γ120; β13j = γ130; β14j = γ140; β15j = γ150; β16j = γ160
The equations for the results presented in Table 5 are outlined below. Note that the equations used to predict cost overruns and
client satisfaction are the same. In the interest of brevity, we present the equations for cost overruns.
Model 1
Level-1:
Cost overrunsij = β0j + β1j Project complexity + β2j Requirements uncertainty + β3j Project size + β4j Service level agreements + β5j
Risk sharing + rij
Level-2:
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Project leader experience + U0j; β1j = γ10; β2j = γ20; β3j = γ30; β4j = γ40; β5j = γ50
Model 2
Level-1:
Cost overrunsij = β0j + β1j Project complexity + β2j Requirements uncertainty + β3j Project size + β4j Service level agreements + β5j
Risk sharing + β6j Firm history + β7j Trust + β8j Clientmeet + β9j Teammeet + β10j ΔProcess + β11j ΔEmployee + β12j ΔParochial +
β13j ΔOpen + β14j ΔLoose + β15j ΔNormative + rij
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Level-2:
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Project leader experience + U0j; β1j = γ10; β2j = γ20; β3j = γ30; β4j = γ40; β5j = γ50; β6j = γ60; β7j = γ70; β8j = γ80; β9j = γ90; β10j
= γ100; β11j = γ110; β12j = γ120; β13j = γ130; β14j = γ140; β15j = γ150
Model 3
Level-1:
Cost overrunsij = β0j + β1j Project complexity + β2j Requirements uncertainty + β3j Project size + β4j Service level agreements + β5j
Risk sharing + β6j Firm history + β7j Trust + β8j Clientmeet + β9j Teammeet + β10j ΔProcess + β11j ΔEmployee + β12j ΔParochial +
β13j ΔOpen + β14j ΔLoose + β15j ΔNormative + rij
Level-2:
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Project leader experience + U0j; β1j = γ10; β2j = γ20; β3j = γ30; β4j = γ40; β5j = γ50; β6j = γ60; β7j = γ70; β8j = γ80; β9j = γ90; β10j
= γ100; β11j = γ110; β12j = γ120; β13j = γ130; β14j = γ140; β15j = γ150
Model 4
Level-1:
Cost overrunsij = β0j + β1j Project complexity + β2j Requirements uncertainty + β3j Project size + β4j Service level agreements + β5j
Risk sharing + β6j Firm history + β7j Trust + β8j Clientmeet + β9j Teammeet + β10j ΔProcess + β11j ΔEmployee + β12j ΔParochial +
β13j ΔOpen + β14j ΔLoose + β15j ΔNormative + β16j ΔUncertainty avoidance + β17j ΔLong-term orientation + β18j ΔPower distance +
β19j ΔMasculinity + β20j ΔIndividualism + rij
Level-2:
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Project leader experience + U0j; β1j = γ10; β2j = γ20; β3j = γ30; β4j = γ40; β5j = γ50; β6j = γ60; β7j = γ70; β8j = γ80; β9j = γ90; β10j
= γ100; β11j = γ110; β12j = γ120; β13j = γ130; β14j = γ140; β15j = γ150; β16j = γ160; β17j = γ170; β18j = γ180; β19j = γ190; β20j = γ200
The equations for the results presented in Table 6 are outlined below. Note that the equations used to predict cost overruns and
client satisfaction are the same. In the interest of brevity, we present the equations for cost overruns.
Model 1
Level-1:
Cost overrunsij = β0j + β1j Project complexity + β2j Requirements uncertainty + β3j Project size + β4j Service level agreements + β5j
Risk sharing + rij
Level-2:
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Project leader experience + U0j; β1j = γ10; β2j = γ20; β3j = γ30; β4j = γ40; β5j = γ50
Model 2
Level-1:
Cost overrunsij = β0j + β1j Project complexity + β2j Requirements uncertainty + β3j Project size + β4j Service level agreements + β5j
Risk sharing + β6j Firm history + β7j Trust + β8j Clientmeet + β9j Teammeet + β10j ΔProcess + β11j ΔEmployee + β12j ΔParochial +
β13j ΔOpen + β14j ΔLoose + β15j ΔNormative + rij
Level-2:
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Project leader experience + U0j; β1j = γ10; β2j = γ20; β3j = γ30; β4j = γ40; β5j = γ50; β6j = γ60; β7j = γ70; β8j = γ80; β9j = γ90; β10j
= γ100; β11j = γ110; β12j = γ120; β13j = γ130; β14j = γ140; β15j = γ150
Model 3
Level-1:
Cost overrunsij = β0j + β1j Project complexity + β2j Requirements uncertainty + β3j Project size + β4j Service level agreements + β5j
Risk sharing + β6j Firm history + β7j Trust + β8j Clientmeet + β9j Teammeet + β10j ΔProcess + β11j ΔEmployee + β12j ΔParochial +
β13j ΔOpen + β14j ΔLoose + β15j ΔNormative + rij
Level-2:
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Project leader experience + γ02 Uncertainty avoidance + γ03 Long-term orientation + γ04 Power distance + γ05
Masculinity + γ06 Individualism + U0j; β1j = γ10; β2j = γ20; β3j = γ30; β4j = γ40; β5j = γ50; β6j = γ60; β7j = γ70; β8j = γ80; β9j = γ90; β10j = γ100; β11j
= γ110; β12j = γ120; β13j = γ130; β14j = γ140; β15j = γ150
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